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A. C. HELVEY, Appellant, v. SELIA SAX et at,
Respondents.
[1] Quieting Title-Burdfln of Proof-Title.-In a quiet title suit,
plaintifi may recover only on the strength of his own title and
not on the weakness of defendant's title.
[2] Id.-Burden of Proof-Title.-A plaintifi relying on f' paper
title alone must trace his title to the government, or to a
grantor in possession at the time of the conveyance to plaintifi,
or to a source common to the chains of title of plaintifI and
. .. ,
defendant.
[3] Taxation-Power of Taxation.-The state's taxing power is
derived from its Ilovereign authority, not from any grant to it
by the owner of property.
[4] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-A property tax operates in rem against the property, and a title
granted by a tax deed pursuant to a valid sale of the property
for nonpayment of taxes conveys not merely the title of the
person a~sessed, but a new and complete title under an independent grant from the state. (Disapproving Syme v. Warden,
114 Cal.App. 707, 7l.l, 300 P. 863.)
[6] Id. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Purchasers-Title.-A purchaser at a tax sale may receive a better title than that of the
person against whom the taxes were assessed, unless he is the
defaulting taxpayer or someone acting in his behalf.
(6] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Title of State.-State's title
to property sold for delinquent taxes is dependent on the validity of the tax proceedings; if the proceedings are invalid
the assessee retains his interest, but if the proceedings are
valid the interest of the a3sessee is replaced by the state's new
and paramount title.
[7] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-The fact
that the state acquires property at a sale for delinquent taxes
by virtue of the assessee's default rather than by grant makes
[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 167;
[4] Quantum of estate
property which is subject
ests, note, 75 A.L.R. 416.
937.

44 Am.Jur. 67.
acquired by purchaser at tax sale of
to successive estates or different interSee, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 387; 51 Am.Jur.

. McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Quieting Title, § 87(2); [3] TaxAhon, § 6; r4,5,7] TaXAtion, § 323; [6J Taxation, § 310; [8,!J j
Waters, § 590; [10-13J Waters, § 592.
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him no less the source of the state's title and of the title of the
purchaser from the state, and the assessee and those claiming
under him are therefore not barred from attacking the title
of the tax sale purchaser.
[8] Waters-County Water Districts-Taxation-Delinquency and
Sale.-The principles established by the Revenue and Taxation
Code, anJ the decisions construing it, are applicable to the
statute relating to the title conveyed to a county water district
for property sold to such district for delinquent taxes.
(3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 47; now Wat. Code,
§ 31948.)
[9] Id. - County Water Districts - Ta.xation - Delinquency and
Sale.-Where plaintiff obtained quitclaim deeds to several parcels of land in a county water district sold to the district for
delinquent taxes, but the deed to one parcel is from a person
not listed as an assessee, plaintiff, in the absence of producing
some document to show that such parcel passed from the assessee to the person from whom plaintiff obtained the deed,
is unable to make out a prima facie case by tracing his title
to a common source.
flO] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting
Tax Titles.-County Water District Act, § 45.5 (now Wat.
Code, §§ 31950,31952), prohibiting any action attacking n deed
to the district six months after recordation of the deed or
three months after the effective date of the section, whichever
is later, applies to tax deeds executed both before and after
its enactment.
[11] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county
17ater district for delinquent taxes, the tax deed on which
defendant bases his title may be introduced in evidence, since
such district is authorized by statute to levy taxes and sell
property taxed if the taxes are not paid, and such deed is
prima facie evidence that the property was assessed as required by law. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124; now Wnt.
Code, § 30000 et seq.)
[12] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county
water district for delinquent taxes, plaintiff may not successfully attack the validity of the taxes on the ground that the
land received no benefits b:;" being included in the district,
where the assessed owners through whom plaintiff cla~ms did
not avail themselves of their statutory remedy to have their
property excluded from the dLtrict on thc ground that it was
not benefited by inclusion therein (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act
9124, § 28; now Wat. Code, § 32200 et seq.), and where they
failed to challenge the taxes in the manner provided by the
County Water District Act.
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[13] Id.-County Water Districts-Taxation-Ac~ions Affecting
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county !
water district for delinquent taxes, plaintiff may not successfully claim that the liens of the taxes were released by the
Federal Reclamation Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 423, 423a), where, assuming that this statute applies to a California water district
on the ground that California ratified the Colorado River Compact, plaintiff does not plead or prove that the Board of Survey and Adjustments had made such a finding with respect
to the property involved in the case.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Stanley Mosk, Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendants modified and
affirmed.
William M. Taylor for Appellant.
Newby, Holder & Newby, Newman & Newman, Earl Redwine and Jonah Jones, Jr., for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The plaintiff, A. C. Helvey, brought this
action to quiet title to several parcels of land in the Coachella
Valley County Water District. Taxes levied by the district
became delinquent and the several parcels were sold to the
district in September, 1939. The parcels were not redeemed
within the time allowed by law and were sold by the district
to the defendants at public auction in 1946 and 1947.
Defendants base their titles on their tax deeds. Plaintiff
relies on quitclaim deeds obtained in 1946 and 1947. Two of
the deeds are from assessees named in the tax deeds; the
third deed is from a person not listed as an assessee. There
is no proof that any of the three predecessors of plaintiff were
in possession at the time of their deeds to plaintiff, nor is
there any proof of antecedent title of the three grantors.
Judgment was entered for defendants and plaintiff appeals.
The question arises at the outset whether plaintiff offered
sufficient evidence supporting his title to make out a prima
facie case to avoid a nonsuit. (See Santens v. Los Angeles
Finance Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [204 P.2d 619]; cases
collected in 22 Cal.Jur. 167.)
[1] In a quiet title suit, the plaintiff may recover only
upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness
of defendant's title. (Rockey v. Vieux, 179 Cal. 681 [178

I
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P. 712] j see 22 Cal.Jur. 167.} [2] A plaintiff relying on a
paper title alone must trace his title (1) to the government;!
or (2) to a grantor in possession at the time of the conveyance
to the plaintiff; or (3) to a source common to the chains of
title of plaintiff and defendant. (Rockey v. Vieux, supra.)
Plaintiff did not offer evidence to sustain a prima facie case,
on either of the first two alternatives. He did sbow tbat bis \
title to two of the three lots was derived from Moorc and
McFadden, assessees named in the deeds from the collector
to the water district.
It is contendcd that plaintiff failed to show a common .
source of title, even as to Moore and McFadden, on tbe ground •
that the new and complete title acquired by the tax deed was
derived from the state and not from the owner of the prop{>rty.
[3] The state's taxing power is derived from its SOVCT'Pig-D
authority, not from any grant to it by the owner of proppJ·ty.
[4] A property tax operates in rem against tbe propt'rty.
and a title granted by a tax deed pursuant to a valid sule
of the property for nonpayment of taxes, conveys not merely
the title of the person assessed, but a new and complete t it Ie
under an independent grant from the state. (Rev. & Tux.
Code, §§ 3712, 3520; California Loan etc. Co. v. Weis, 118
Cal. 489, 492, 494 [50 P. 697]; Connors v. Jerome, 83 Cal.
App.2d 330 [188 P.2d 770] ; see Smith v. Addiego, 54 Cal.
App.2d 230, 237 [129 P.2d 953] ; 75 A.L.R. 416; 51 Am.Jur.,
Taxation, 937.) The statement in Syme v. Warden, 114 Cal.
App. 707, 712 [300 P. 863], that a tax deed conveYfi only
such interest as the taxpayer has in the land was unnecessary
to thc decision therein. It is inconsistent with the foregoing
cases and presently controlling statutes and is disapproved.
In Dorn v. Baker, 96 Cal. 206, 209 [31 P. 37], the purchaser
at the tax sale received only the equitable interest of the
assessee in state school land, since the fee owned by the state
was not subject to taxation. (People v. Chambers, 37 Cal.2d
552, 555 [233 P.2d 557]; State Land Settlement Board v.
Henderson, 197 Cal. 470, 479 [241 P. 560] ; San Pedro etc.
R. R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 22 [179 P. 393].)
[5] A purchaser at the tax sale may thus receive a better
title than that of the person against whom the taxes were
assessed, unless he is the defaulting taxpayer or someone
acting in his behalf. (Dowd v. Glenn, 54 Cal.App.2d 748, 755
[129 P.2d 964].)
It does not follow, however, that an owner out of posses.
sion, or persons claiming under him, cannot establish a prima
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facie case by tracing title to the assessed owner. [6] The
proceedings against the property are the means by which the
state obtains its title. If the proceedings are invalid, the
assessee retains his interest. If the proceedings are valid,
the interest of the assessee is replaced by the state's Dew
and paramount title. The title of the state is thus dependent on the validity of the tax proceedings, just as the interest
of an ordinary grantee is dependent on an effective conveyance by his grantor. The assessee's interest is extinguished,
because he fails to pay the taxes or redeem the property.
[7] The fact that the state acquires the property by virtue
of his default rather than by grant makes him no less the
source of the state's title and of the title of the purchaser
from the state. (Denning v. Green, 88 Cal.App. 379, 381 [263
P. 819] ; Denning v. Green, 119 Cal.App. 102, 104 [6 P.2d 317) ;
Ginaca v. Peterson, 262 F. 904, 907; Godding v. Swanson,
165 Pa.Super. 193 [67 A.2d 814] ; Porter v. Carroll, 84 Fla.
62 [92 So. 809].) The assessee and those claiming under him
are therefore not barred from attacking the title of the tax
sale purchaser.
[8] The principles established by the Revenue and Taxation Code, and the decisions construing it, are applicable to
the similar statute involved in the present case. (3 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 47,· now Wat. Code, § 31948; see
Dowd v. Glenn, 54 Cal.App.2d 748 [129 P.2d 964].)
[9] The plaintiff in this action traced his paper title to
Lots four and six to the assessees. On Lot two, however, plaintiff produced only a quitclaim deed from one Brady. The deed
to the district is included in the record and shows that the
property was assessed to one I vans. An inference may be
drawn from the testimony that Ivans was the deceased mother
of Brady. Plaintiff, however, did not produce a deed or a
decree of distribution to show that the property passed from
hans to Brady. Plaintiff was thus unable to make out a prima
facie case by tracing his and Dunlap's title to a common source.
[10] Plaintiff's action against defendant Budrovic is barred
by the statute of limitations, which Budrovic pleaded. Section 45.5 of the County Water District Act (now Wat. Code,

)

., 'Such deed duly acknowledged or proved is (except as against actual
fraud) conclusive evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings from
the assessment by the assessor inclusive up to the execution of the deed.
The deed conveys to the district the absolute title to the lands descrihed
t11Prein, free of all encumbrances, except when the land is owned by
the United States or this State in which case it is prima facie llvidence
of the right of pOlisession."

)
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§§ 31950, 31952) prevents any action attacking a deed to the
district six months after the recordation of the deed, or three
months after the effective date of the section (January 30,
1941), whichever is later. The statute applies to tax deeds
executed both before and after its enactment. (McCaslin
v. Hamblen, 37 Ca1.2d 196 [231 P.2d 1]; Tannhauser v.
Adams, 31 Ca1.2d 169, 176 [187 P.2d 716, 5 A.L.R.2d 1015] ;
Central Valley Equip. Co. v. State, 98 Cal.App.2d 778 [220
P.2d 811] ; Davault v. Essig, 80 Cal.App.2d 970 (183 P.2d
39].) Since plaintiff commenced this action in 1947, over
six years after the effective date of section 45.5, his action is
barred.
Although defendant Carreon did not plead the statute
of limitations, plaintiff's attack on his title fails on the merits.
For the same reasons his attack on the titles of Dunlap and
Budrovic must fail, even if he were able to make out a prima
facie case against Dunlap and his action against Budrovic
were not barred by the statute of limitations.
[11] There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that the
tax deed could not be introduced in evidence, on the ground
that defendants did not show that the district had the powel'
to levy taxes, The district has all the powers of distrieh
organized under the County Water District Act (3 Deerinl! 's
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, now Wat. Code, § 30000 et seq.; S('P
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6178, now Wat. Code, § 33135).
which authorizes the district to levy taxes and sell property
taxed, if the taxes are not paid. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, A("t
9124, §§ 21-22, now Wat. Code, § 31745 et seq.) Moreover.
the tax deeds were prima facie evidence that the property
was assessed as required by law. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws.
Act 9124, § 47, now Wat. Code, § 31947.)
[12] Plaintiff contends that the taxes are void on Hl<'
ground that the parcels involved in this action received no
benefits by being included in the district. This contention
comes too late. The assessed owners through whom plaintiff
claims did not avail themselves of their stlltutorv remedv to
have their property excluded from the district o~ the grdund
that it was not benefited by inclusion therein. (3 Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 28, now Wat. Code, § 32200 et seq.;
see Hand v. El DOl'ado Irr, Di.~t., 97 Cal.App. 740 [276 P. 1371 :
San Joaquin Anr. Corp. v. Board of Supervi.~or.~. 1?1 Cal.
App. 468 r8 P.2d 1051].) Moreover, there if; nothing in thf'
t'vidf'llee to show that plaintiff's preo(>Cf'f;f;OrS (' hl1 Hen [!f'Cl the
taxes in the manner provided by the County Water District
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At't. There was 110 attempt to have the tnx assessments
mod ified or cancelJed, or to set aside the tax deeds to the
distri(:t. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 3S, now Wat.
Code, § 3191j5.) Since plaintiff's predecessors in interest
faileu to challenge the tax in the D,anner required by statute,
plallltifi' is now precluded from making a collateral attack on
thl" tax proceedings. (Wall v. ill. <17 R. Shtep Co., 33 Ca1.2d
i(i~. 172 [205 P.2d 14J ; see Reclamation Dist. v. Turner, 104
Ca1. 334, 335 l37 P. 1038] ; see Durnbarton Land ct Imp. Co.
v. Murphy, 32 Cal.App. 626, 630 [163 P. 866].)
[13] Plaintiff also contends that the liens of the taxes
were released by the Federal Reclamation Act (43 U.S.C.
§§ 423, 423a), which provides that lands found to be permallently unproductive by the Board of Survey and Adjustments
shall be excluded from irrigation districts. Even if it is
assumed that this statute applies to a California water district
01) the ground that California ratified the Colorado River
Compact, plaintiff made no attempt to plead or prove that
the Board of Survey and Adjustments had made such a finding with respect to the lands involved in this case.
The trial court ordered judgment for plaintiff on parcels
fiY(' and eight, against defendants who had defaulted, but the
judgment as entered failed to giYe judgment to plaintiff against
the dcfalllting defendants. Plaintiff is entitled to a correct
judgment. The trial court is therefore directed to modify
the judgment to quiet plaintiff's title against the defaulting
defendants to lots five and eight. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall bear the costs of appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J.,
and Spence, J. concurred.
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